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PREFACE 
This publication is prepared under a collaborative research 
project concerning rural finance in the Philippines. The 
principal collaborating institutions are the Philippine Institute 
for Development Studies (PIDS), the Agricultural Credit Policy 
Council (ACPC), and the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI). OSU participation is funded by the USAID Mission in the 
Philippines and the Bureau of Science and Technology, AID, 
Washington. The views expressed in these publications are those 
of the authors and may not be shared by any of the collaborating 
or sponsoring institutions. 
A complete list of publications produced by osu for this 
project is provided at the end of this paper. 
RURAL FINANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
RECENT CHANGES AND PRIORITY ISSUE~/ 
by 
Richard L. Meyer 
Two years ago, when the World Bank and USAID were planning 
their co-financed Rural Financial Services Project, the Philip-
pines faced serious problems in its rural financial sector, but 
there was little expectation that rapid change would occur in the 
basic approach to rural finance. The situation today is strik-
ingly different. Some financial reforms were initiated beginning 
in the early 1980s, but many were taken at the insistence of the 
Central Bank and lacked widespread acceptance. The fall of the 
Marcos regime opened up new possibilities for dialogue and change 
that were hardly imaginable just two years ago. The rural 
financial system still faces serious challenges, but a number of 
important changes have occurred and some key preconditions have 
been met which lay the groundwork for a stronger system. The 
purpose of this paper is to summarize some of these key develop-
menta, to assess their probable impact, and to identify some of 
the remaining issues to be tackled. 
Before taking up the details, two general observations 
should be made to place the Philippines experience in broader 
perspective. First, the road to financial reform is not yet 
clearly marked and the interaction between financial and non-
financial reforms is beginning to be better appreciated. Several 
!/ I am indebted to 3on Halpern, Mario Lamberte and Bruce 
Tolentino for discussions about several ideas presented 
here. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America have underqone 
major economic reforms and now have a decade or more of ex-
perience. Their achievements and shortcomings are becoming 
evident. A recent book by Connolly and Gonzalez-Vega describe 
some of these as does a paper by Corbo and Melo. Second, the 
long-term nature of the financial reform process and the setbacks 
that may periodically occur are evident in the Indonesian 
experience, and were discussed by Jafri and Patten in a recent 
evaluation of the USAID rural finance project in Bangladesh. 
These experiences seem to imply, amongst other things, that for 
financial reforms to be effective they must be supported by 
appropriate policies in other sectors, that reform does not 
follow a simple linear path, and that major setbacks can occur, 
especially due to uncontrolled internal political problems and 
changes in the external macroeconomic environment. These 
considerations must be kept in mind when analyzing a country like 
the Philippines where the new political regime is still far from 
being consolidated. An encouraging observation is that this 
regime, unlike the one it succeeded, so far seems to have avoided 
the pitfall of using the financial system to buy short-term 
political support. 
Three recent publications summarize key rural finance 
developments and needs. The first is the excellent comprehensive 
literature review of rural financial markets by Lamberte and Lim. 
The second is the analysis prepared by a group of social scien-
tists from academe and research institutions (hereafter referred 
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to as PIDS) of the first eleven months of the Aquino government. 
The third is the paper by Tolentino analyzing several of the 
recent program and policy changes. The first section of this 
paper draws heavily from these publications for organization and 
content. The second section discusses a number of additional 
issues that appear to the writer to be important for the future 
of rural finance in the Philippines. 
KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND REMAINING PRIORITIES 
~onetary Policy 
The Philippines financial sector has been dominated during 
the past few years by policies that stressed credit allocation, 
raised intermediation costs, and were biased against deposit 
mobilization. The Aquino government inherited several weak and 
failing banks, and the rural financial system, especially Rural 
Banks, was in serious trouble. Recent policy changes have helped 
to reduce the allocative function and to restore the stabiliza-
tion function of the Central Bank. Specifically, the rediscount 
rate has been made uniform and aligned with the market rate, the 
rediscount rate has been lowered from 12.75 to 10%, reserve 
requirements have been lowered from 24 to 21%, and there has been 
a substantial reduction in outstanding Central Bank bills. The 
charters of the Development Bank of the Philippines and the 
Philippines National Bank have been revised, some nonperforming 
assets have been transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust 
(APT), and some special bank privileges have been phased out. 
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The PIDS evaluation notes that intermediation costs are 
still very high, however, and that PD717 (requiring banks to lend 
25% of their portfolios to agriculture) should be repealed along 
with the 5% gross receipts tax (GRT). In the absence of a strong 
competitive banking system, these high intermediation costs are 
passed on to consumers rather than absorbed by financial institu-
tions. It is questionable whether this form of taxation (with 
the increase in interest costs it implies) is the most socially 
desireable way to raise government revenues in light of the 
reported weak credit demand and the slow pace of economic 
recovery. Furthermore, the disincentives for financial savings 
have actually increased because of the increase from 17.5 to 20% 
in the tax rate on interest income. This has occurred just when 
the tax on dividend income has been removed. This effort to 
encourage depositors to shift to the equity market can only 
benefit the relatively rich in urban areas at the expense of 
rural depositors with fewer investment alternatives. 
Rural Financial Markets 
The credit allocation schemes, the heavy role of creJit 
subsidies, the myriad of rules and regulations, and the distor-
tions and fragmented financial markets that resulted were most 
obvious in the rural sector under the previous regime. A most 
serious outcome was the destruction of the Rural Banking system 
due to accumulated arrearages with the Central Bank, a lack of 
discipline amongst both bankers and borrowers, and an undermining 
of rural deposit mobilization. This situation made it difficult 
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for sound rural financial intermediation to develop and, indeed, 
it is surprising that some Rural Banks were able to survive the 
last fifteen years as well as they did, and that some commercial 
banks were able to find rural market niches for profitable 
operations. 
The reforms which began in the early 1980 1 s coupled with 
recent actions have improved the conditions for sound rural 
financial intermediation. The uniform and market oriented 
rediscount rate has replaced selective credit policy, loan 
allocations and credit subsidies. The creation of the Rural Bank 
Review and Rationalization Committee and the adoption of its 
rehabilitation plan, the creation of the Comprehensive Agricul-
tura1 Loan Fund (CALF) which merged seventeen out of the thirty--
nine separate loan funds for the commodity programs previously 
implemented by the Department of Agriculture, and the creation of 
the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) to manage CALF and 
synchronize all agricultural credit policies and programs are the 
most noteworthy developments.l/ 
Much remains to be done, however, to assure the orderly 
development of the rural financial markets. Current regulations 
still restrict bank entry and branching, and Rural Banks are 
being closed at the rate of about one per week (currently about 
850 remain out of the more than 1,000 that existed a few years 
ago) without a suitable alternative to take their place in many 
2/ These developments and their apparent implications were 
analyzed by Douglas Graham. Corales and Cuevas analyzed the 
partial effects of interest rate deregulation. 
6 
local markets. It is not clear what assistance, if any, finan-
cia1 institutions in rural areas need to help them respond to the 
new unregulated environment where deposit mobilization is 
supposed to replace Central Bank funds. It is not clear, for 
example, the extent to which a weak Rural Bank with a poor 
community image can successfully compete for deposits. As noted 
in recent interviews with two Batangas bankers, an aggressive 
deposit mobilization program by a RB may actually be interpreted 
by customers as a sign that it is near collapse. Furthermore, 
the Rural Bank crisis has logically absorbed the attention of 
policy makers while other financial opportunities may have been 
neglected such as the prospects for strengthening rural coopera-
tives and cooperative rural banks. 
Two specific issues regarding the Rural Banks are of concern 
to the writer. One is the recent problem of excess liquidity in 
some Rural Banks. An apparent cause is tighter loan appraisal, 
but it is also suggested that rural loan demand is weak. One 
wonders whether or not this represents market failure in that 
Rural Banks are unable to identify credit-worthy projects when 
thrust out of their customary role of following specific CB rules 
and regulations for targeted 1ending. 3 / Alternatively, perhaps 
government offices are not efficient in performing their role of 
~I Gonzalez-Vega of OSU noted that one of the problems en-
countered in the recent USAID project to open deposit 
windows in rural branches of the Agricultural Development 
Bank in the Dominican Republic was that the bank management, 
accustomed to only lending Central Bank funds, was reluctant 
to develop its own lending programs for fear that funds 
would be unavailable when depositors demanded withdrawals. 
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identifying alternative enterprises for local investors. There 
is no evidence that the CB has noted this liquidity problem, 
which may be unique in the Rural Bank experience, and is attempt-
ing to do anything about it. Seasonal and regional surpluses and 
deficits should be expected in any rural banking system, however, 
and an appropriate mechanism must be created, perhaps by the CB, 
to help the system manage these liquidity problems. Otherwise, 
rural deposit mobilization will be discouraged, lending will be 
restricted to short-term, and loan/deposit ratios will be kept 
low because rural banks will be forced into a conservative asset 
portfolio. It may also encourage banks to extract deposits from 
rural areas for urban lending. Central Bank regulations current-
ly restrict interbank movement of funds because of the deposit 
retention scheme and the fact that Rural Bank deposits in another 
bank are treated as loans rather than bank reserves. 
The second issue concerns the role that the Land Bank will 
play as it becomes a stock holder for the Rural Banks which 
select that option under the rehabilitation program. Graham 
suggests that over 500 Rural Banks may be eligible to voluntarily 
join the rehabilitation program but only time will tell how many 
will actually choose the Land Bank option. Suppose that 200 do. 
Although the Land Bank is recognized as being a strong institu-
tion (late in the Marcos regime there was a suggestion to merge 
it with the weaker DBP and PNB), it is questionable if it really 
has the capacity to selectively resolve the problems of 200 
individual banks when simply occupying a seat on the bank's board 
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may be an insufficient intervention to ensure viability. As 
noted below, the proposed land reform program will also place 
huge demands on the institution and the Land Bank president has 
announced his intention of moving more aggressively into commer-
cial banking. Will the transfer of this portion of the RB debt 
and management problem from the CB to the Land Bank really 
rehabilitate the banks? Under what conditions can it be expected 
to do so? Are the incentives adequate for other banks to share 
with the Land Bank the task of this rehabilitation effort? 
It has been frequently argued that Central Bank policies, 
rules and regulations have impeded rather than foster the 
development of viable formal financial institutions in rural 
areas. It is not clear the extent to which commercial and 
development banks might have expanded rural operations under more 
favorable conditions, or how effective Rural Banks might have 
been if encouraged to mobilize more deposits rather than push 
cheap government credit. These issues of structure and regula-
tion will be better understood after the SGV group completes its 
Rural Banking Services study for the Central Bank scheduled for 
August or September, and PIDS/OSU completes its comparative bank 
study. The ACPC/PIDS/OSU study and experimentation with deposit 
mobilization will also shed light on the potential for and 
problems of mobilizing deposits in rural areas. 
Agricultural ang Natural Resources Policy 
Rural banking cannot be viable unless the agricultural 
sector it serves is profitable. This lesson is abundantly clear 
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from the U.S. experience of the past few years. When agriculture 
is weak or disorganized or poorly monetized, the only lenders 
that survive are those with a small agricultural loan portfolio 
that can be subsidized by nonagricultural operations. Recommen-
dations made to the new Aquino government by faculty at the 
University of the Philippines, both Diliman and Los Banos, argued 
for improved terms of trade for agriculture and the removal of 
serious structural bottlenecks!/. The government has responded 
by dismantling the sugar and coconut monopolies, removal of 
export taxes on agricultural products except logs, liberalizing 
fertilizer importation, lifting the copra export ban and reducing 
the role of NFA trading in wheat, flour and other feed imports. 
Other problems have not yet been tackled or have lagged 
because of budget constraints. Procurement at NFA support prices 
has been limited because of cutbacks in government support, the 
NIA spent more than its allocated funds on large-scale irrigation 
systems leaving relatively less for smaller-scale systems, and 
the reorganization of the agricultural research and extension 
system has been slow. In the natural resources area, a log export 
ban has been put in effect while the government reviews its 
program of concessions, but relatively little appears to have 
been done in the fisheries sector. 
Overall, the PIDS document applauds the rapid dismantling of 
price disincentives but the authors feel that with the current 
!/ These recommendations were contained in the reports Economic 
Recovery ~nd Long-Run Growth: Agenda for_B~Jorm~, PIDS and 
~gen~~ for Action for the Philippine Rural_Sector, UPLB. 
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exchange rate agriculture is still not getting sufficient 
protection from imports. Land reform, of course, is the key 
structural issue being debated and more will be said about it in 
the next section. 
EMERGING ISSUES 
There are a number of issues that the writer feels deserve 
special attention either because they represent long-standing 
problems or have emerged because of recent developments. 
Land Reform 
The next few weeks will be crucial for land reform policy. 
The writer was invited by Secretary Dominguez to give a seminar 
in May on the Chilean agrarian reform to the land reform task 
force. It was clear from the discussion that followed that there 
may be a brief window of opportunity for the Aquino government to 
enact an expanded program before the new Congress assembles in 
3uly. 
The Philippines is probably paying a price for the uncer-
tainty rural investors are now facing. First the uncertainty was 
due to the change in regime, then to the recent elections, and 
now to the land reform debate. Some investors are probably 
postponing investments until they feel more secure about the 
future. The longer the debate drags on the more devastating it 
will be to agricultural investment, production and rural employ-
ment. Experience in other countries seems to suggest that land 
reform must be simple and swift to be effective. This is 
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difficult by definition in a country implementing reform through 
a democratic process with a need to respect legal rights and to 
provide fair compensation. 
The financial aspects of any reform program will be crucial 
and ACPC is putting in a great deal of effort to develop some of 
the financial components. High levels of compensation to owners 
should reduce opposition but will increase the eventual cost to 
beneficiaries if they are expected to reimburse the costs. The 
mismatch in payment schedule between the one used to compensate 
owners and the one used to recover payments from beneficiaries 
will increase the government's financial cash flow problem of 
land transfer. The additional costs for supportive services may 
also be high, and the writer is concerned about the Land Bank's 
capacity to simultaneously expand the reform program and engage 
in Rural Bank rehabilitation. 
The current land reform brief proposes an adjustment loan 
for beneficiaries of land as a way to substitute for the expected 
disruption in government and landowner services when reform is 
undertaken. In the seminar, the writer objected to the proposed 
fixed 6 percent interest rate on this loan as it smacks of the 
previous subsidized credit system which caused so many problems 
for the financial system. It appears that a newer version of the 
proposal specifies market determined rates. Another problem is 
that the planners view this loan as an entitlement which would 
seem to be eventually perceived as such by beneficiaries and, 
therefore, may be translated into an even poorer repayment 
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performance than already exists for the current land reform 
program. A grant provided to beneficiaries may be far better as 
it would introduce fewer distortions into the financial system. 
Hayami et.al. have noted the special working capital needs 
of beneficiaries expected to produce longer-term crops such as 
sugarcane and pineapples. Contract farming arrangements may 
provide inputs, markets and loans for some farmers producing 
these longer cycle crops. A recent paper by Floro discusses the 
role of farmer-lenders and trader-lenders in rice and corn 
producing areas and shows their significance in areas that have 
been the focal point for subsidized credit. Esguerra conducted a 
brief survey of some Ministry of Agriculture programs designed to 
provide loans which link input, product and credit markets. The 
record of some of these programs, especially regarding loan 
recovery, appears to be better than other credit lines. 
It is clear that if accelerated land reform becomes a 
reality in the Philippines in the next few weeks there will be 
several financial and credit issues to be addressed. It will be 
important then to monitor the emerging design of the program to 
see that it does not undermine the commendable progress made in 
rural finance in recent years. 
Formal/Informal Financial Linkages 
In several Asian countries, a rethinking of the role of 
informal financial systems is underway. The ADB regional 
research project on informal finance is indicative of this 
renewed interest. As in the Philippines, the general v~ew is 
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that the informal sector has reemerged in rural areas due to the 
failure of many formal credit programs. Actually it may have 
been important all along but conveniently overlooked or down-
played in the zeal to develop formal institutions. 
The attractiveness of informal finance is two fold: first, 
it may be the only way to provide financial services to the 
poorest rural households located on the most distant farms 
because of the high costs of formal institutions in servicing 
such customers. Secondly, although informal sources also 
experiences loan losses, their loan recovery record seems to be 
better than for many formal institutions. There are at least two 
concerns, however, about the informal sector. The first is the 
time honored view, especially on the Indian subcontinent, that 
informal sources charge usurious lending rates and earn monopoly 
profits on their operations. Both Harriss and Floro present data 
which tend to refute this assertion however. The second is that 
informal sources and especially farm-lenders are socially un-
desirable because their primary objective is to acquire the land 
of mortgaged farms. Here Floro's arguments about the distinction 
in motives between farmer-lenders and trader-lenders are useful. 
It is clear that there is much to be learned about the 
practices of the informal sector in the Philippines, how it is 
linked to the formal sector, how these linkages affect the 
ultimate borrowers, and how the formal and informal sectors 
evolve under different crop regimes and in different ecological 
areas. The IRRI/OSU study of formal/informal financial linkages 
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will build on the Floro and Esguerra work to improve our under-
standing and provide insights for appropriate policy making. A 
key question is whether or not specific programs should be 
designed to facilitate such linkages or if it is adequate to 
simply ascertain that any restrictive regulations are reduced so 
the linkages can naturally develop when the market demands them. 
Risk Reducing Mechanisms 
Risk reducing mechanisms may emerge as the most important 
factor affecting the future supply of rural credit now that some 
of the resource allocation and subsidy schemes have been reduced 
or eliminated. The experience from other countries suggests that 
many crop and loan programs have been ineffective and have 
saddled governments with huge losses. CALF funds are now destined 
to support the existing guarantee facilities of the Philippine 
Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), the Guarantee Fund for Small 
and Medium Enterprises (GFSME), and the Quedon Guarantee Fund 
Board (QGFB). This is an important development since these 
guarantees are generally perceived to be well run. There are 
suggestions that the crop insurance program should be expanded to 
include more crops, and a report submitted to the Central Bank on 
the subject should be evaluated for possible action. 
Another guarantee issue concerns deposit insurance. The 
ACPC/PIDS/OSU study will seek some insights from rural households 
concerning their perceptions about such insurance and whether or 
not it affects deposit behavior. Apparently some depositors 
experienced long delays in gaining access to their funds when 
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some urban banks were closed and it will be important to see if 
rural households are affected by this fact. Another side of the 
issue is the method of operation of the insurance program, its 
viability and the risk exposure it has with Rural Banks. 
These topics would seem to be prime candidates for research 
by the type of staff that Citibank/ABT will likely field for its 
research component. The SGV study and recommendations due in a 
few months should provide a useful starting point for this 
research. 
~ank R~ul~~~pn anq su2port 
The Central Bank of the Philippines, like many central banks 
in Asia, adopted a more aggressive development oriented role two 
to three decades ago. A key program has been the expansion of 
the banking system into rural areas which actually began as part 
of the package of programs put in effect in the 1950s to counter 
the Huk insurgency. The problem alleged by many is that the CB 
capacity has been limited largely to developing a set of rules 
and regulations which reached such detail as defining the themes 
for the annual Rural Bank conferences and approving maintenance 
expenses.for individual Rural Bank vehicles! The supervisory 
function is reported to be strongest on auditing compliance with 
these rules and weakest in providing management or technical 
support. At the same time, the Rural Bankers Association and the 
Cooperative Rural Banks Federation, both of which should be able 
to identify some of the crucial needs of their members, have nat 
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yet progressed very far towards developing the capacity to 
provide support services. 
The most promising recent institutional development is the 
creation of ACPC. It has gotten off to a fast start with a small 
but dynamic professional staff. Two questions arise, of course, 
with respect to the creation of any new institution. First, will 
it really be given the opportunity and responsibility to develop 
an appropriate support system for rural banking? Second, if 
given this opportunity and responsibility, will it have the 
capacity to implement it? To date, ACPC has performed well 
because it has "done its homework". There is always a certain 
irony in that those agencies known to do good work are often 
given more work to do until finally they become swamped and can•t 
maintain their quality standard. This could happen to ACPC, or an 
even worse scenario for rural finance could emerge if the best 
senior staff are reassigned to other agencies. Hopefully 
sufficient local and foreign support will be available so this 
promising institution will flourish and attain its full poten-
tial. 
The best future division of labor for the development/ 
regulatory/support/advocacy dimensions of rural banking is not 
obvious given the present activities of the CB, ACPC and the 
trade associations. This is a long-term issue and one that would 
seem to be a natural topic for the experience and expertise that 
Citibank/ABT can bring to it. 
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A closely related issue for further study is that of an apex 
or lead bank for the rural sector. This issue has been talked 
about for some time but the writer has seen no analysls which 
carefully discusses the reasons for such an institution and the 
functions it might perform. The problem of managing liquidity as 
noted above may require an institution to facilitate the inter-
bank flow of funds amongst surplus and deficit units. Before that 
argument can be made, however, rural financial institutions must 
demonstrate they can actually mobilize large volumes of deposits 
and that these deposits in fact follow sharp seasonal or regional 
patterns. There is always the fear that part of the reason for 
advocating an apex institution is the unstated objective of 
capturing cheap government or foreign funds, an approach which 
disabled many of the strong Latin American credit unions during 
the 1970s. In contradiction to the present effort to clean up 
the system through CALF, this would be stepping backward to 
create a COW with lots of cheap milk. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
In spite of more than three decades of pump priming, 
subsidization and regulation, rural financial markets in the 
Philippines are dominated by weak and fragmented institutions. 
The ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural output has 
actually gone down in recent years, and Rural Banks (the corner-
stone of the effort to bring rural banking closest to the farming 
community) are being closed at the rate of one per week. 
Desireable policy changes were started in the early 1980s and 
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have been accelerated by the Aquino government. They have laid 
the base on which a stronger system can be built. The structure 
of that system is not yet clear and will emerge slowly over time. 
The several pieces of policy oriented research that are underway 
or can be initiated soon will help determine the extent to which 
current policies and programs will have the desired effect. In 
the meantime there appear to be plenty of rural finance issues 
for the government and the new Congress to deal with using 
current information. 
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